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PARENT-CHILD TORT LIABILITY AND COMPULSORY INSURANCE

The concept of unity of legal identity, recognized by the common
law in the husband-wife relationship, was not adhered to in the parentchild area. Consequently there were no theoretical obstacles to the
maintenance of suits between the parent and child. Rather, the minor
was regarded as a separate legal entity who was fully responsible for
his own wrongs and entitled to the enjoyment of his own property.'
Thus causes of action between parent and minor child in matters of
property were freely recognized. 2 Nevertheless, it is far from clear
whether at common law a minor child was allowed to prosecute a
suit against his parent for a personal tort. Some courts have suggested that the absence of judicial decisions in this area supports the3
proposition that no such action was recognized at common law.
Others have reasoned that this4 absence shows rather that the validity
of the action was undisputed.
In 1891, however, a Mississippi case, 5 citing no authority, established the rule that an unemancipated child could not bring an action
for a personal tort against his parent. The basis of the denial was
not that the parent had no duty with respect to his child, but rather
that the child had no right to bring a civil action against his parent.,
Succeeding courts in upholding this rule have relied on a number of
considerations of public policy, of which the most frequently cited
has been the view that the allowance of such actions would disturb
the peace and harmony
of the family which is essential to a well7
ordered society.
Another view, repeatedly urged, is that such actions would impair parental authority. Some courts have reasoned that to permit
the child to recover would be unfair to the other members of the
family since the family fund would be depleted. 9 And other courts
have denied the right of a minor to recover, alluding to the somewhat
I See PROSSER, TORTS 675 (2d ed. 1955).
2 See, e.g., Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1057-58

(1930).
3 See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12, 13 (1923); Matarese
v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198, 199 (1925).
4 See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923, 924 (1951); Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 906 (1930).
5 Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
6 Ibid.

7 See, e.g., Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753, 755 (1929)
Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12, 15 (1923).
8 See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468, 469 (1938);
Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
9 See, e.g., Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708, 711 (1932);
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788, 789 (1905).
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imaginative ground that the defendant might inherit the amount recovered should the plaintiff die.' 0
It has been said that these cases afford an example of a doctrinaire application of legal formulae without a realistic recognition
of the effect of liability insurance."
The Insurance Law
The widespread use of the automobile in American society and
the concomitant toll on life and property caused the New York
12
Legislature in 1929 to enact the Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act.
The act, which demanded proof of financial security only after a
motorist was involved in an accident,"3 was an attempt by the legislature to cope with the pressing and disruptive problem of uncompensated accident victims. In 1956, New York enacted the Motor
Vehicle Financial Security Act,' 4 commonly known as the "Compulsory Insurance Law." As stated by the legislature, the act, by
demanding financial security upon registration of the vehicle, is designed to compensate innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents by
assuring that motorists be financially able to respond in damages for
their negligent acts. 15
It is in the light of compulsory insurance that we will re-examine
the time-honored reasons advanced in support of the immunity doctrine and attempt to show that they no longer have any realistic basis.
(A) Disturbing Domestic Tranquility
In upholding the immunity doctrine, it was argued with a great
display of emotion that to recognize a cause of action in favor of a
child against a parent would destroy the harmony and peace of the
But several courts, in passing on the immunity rule, have
family.'
suggested that when a child brings an action, the likelihood is that
Roller v. Roller, supra note 9.
:1 See James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts,
15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431, 432 (1950); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 553 (1948).
12 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 695.
10

23

Ibid.

§§ 93 to 93-k (Supp. 1958). In its declaration of purpose the act, in 9 93, states that "the legislature is concerned over
the rising toll of motor vehicle accidents . . . ." and that "it is a matter of
grave concern that motorists shall be financially able to respond in damages
for their negligent acts, so that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents
may be recompensed for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon them."
'5 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 93 (Supp. 1958).
16 See Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C . 577, 118 S.E. 12, 15-16 (1923) ; McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Reiation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1074
(1930).
'14 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFIc LAW
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the peace of the home has already been disturbed beyond repair. 17
As was said in Dunlap v. Dunlap, "The communal family life is held
together and its continuity assured by something finer than legal
command." 18 Furthermore, since minors have always been able to
sue their parents in matters affecting property rights, several courts
expressed dismay at the basic inconsistency of the "domestic tranquility" rationale. 19 They asserted that since this argument is not
considered where property rights are involved, it ought2 0not to stand
in the way where the claim relates to personal injuries.
Thus it would seem that even before the extensive use of liability insurance the family tranquility argument was not universally
accepted. Whether the reason retains any validity in light of the insurance law is doubtful. Now that insurance coverage is almost absolute one practical fact should be realized,.and that is that a suit between a minor child and a parent is, in reality, a friendly one. Today
21
the real party in interest is the insurer rather than the insured.
Such a suit would not be a vindictive one, nor would it be designed
to harass the parent, but rather it would he an attempt to secure the
benefits provided and paid for under the insurance contract. These
benefits serve a definite social purpose, for not only would the onerous
burden of medical expenses be removed from the parent, but, more
important, adequate medical attention would be available to the child.
These benefits are some of the factors that cause a happy home to
exist, and the fact that they must be obtained through the courts in
no way detracts from their worth. Thus, it would seem that rather
than disturb domestic tranquility, a recovery by a child under an insurance policy would tend to aid it.
(B) Parental Authority
It has been argued that to subject the parent to uncontrolled
suits would be subversive of discipline.2 2 However true this may
have been, when viewed in the light of the insurance law the conception becomes unrealistic. It would seem reasonable to presume
that the parent would be the initiator of any suit against himself.
Realizing that the only adverse effect would be a negligible increase
in his insurance rate, the parent would urge the child to sue in order
to come within the provisions of the policy. It does not follow, therefore, that there would be a resulting impairment of parental authority
if such suits were recognized by the courts.
17 See, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 8 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 914 (1930); Borst
v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, 153 (1952).
Is Dunlap v. Dunlap, su-pra note 17, at 915.
19 See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952); Borst
v. Borst, supra note 17.
20 Signs v. Signs, supra note 19.
21 James & Thornton, The Impact of Inwurance on the Law of Torts, 15
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431, 433 (1950).
22 See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (1923); Wick
v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
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(C) Depletion of Family Funds
According to this "family exchequer" argument the family property should not be appropriated by one minor child to the detriment
of the other members of the family. 23 With insurance this argument
cuts both ways. If a child is injured and is prohibited from recovering on the insurance contract, the father, and thus the family, suffer
a corresponding depletion of funds because of the medical expenses
involved. It would seem that from a public policy standpoint the
precise reason that has long been urged in denying suits by minors
may now be advanced in favor of such actions. Furthermore, since
these actions would, in effect, be friendly ones there is little fear that
there would be an attempted recovery beyond the coverage of the
policy.
(D) Inheritance
It has been suggested that if a parent is compelled to pay damages to a minor child he would, as next of kin, reacquire the amount
so paid in the event of the child's death during minority. Therefore
he should not be compelled to pay damages which he might later get
back.2 4 Even before compulsory insurance this reason had been attacked as a poor one.25 It has been asserted that recovery to one in
every other respect deserving of it, ought not be denied because of
this remote contingency.20 One court considered this reason nothing
more than a mere makeweight. 27 Nevertheless, it might regain some
of its lost regard because of liability insurance: whereas the reason
formerly was employed because it would be a useless act to have the
parent pay damages that he may later inherit, it may now be urged
to prevent him from profiting from his own "wrong." That is, the
courts may assert that since recovery would not be from the pocket
of the father, but rather from the insurance company, an inheritance
from the child would in a sense be an unwarranted profit. But a
valid cause of action ought not be denied because there is a remote
possibility that the "wrongdoer" may profit from it. And since the
"wrong" is merely a negligent one, not intentional, even if the contingency should occur it would not be an unwarranted profit in the
true sense of the word.
23 See, e.g., Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708, 711 (1932);

Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788, 789 (1905).

24 Roller v. Roller, supra note 23.
25 See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 909 (1930) ; McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1073

(1930).

26 McCurdy, supra note 25, at 1073.
27 Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 25, at 909.
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Analogy to Spouses
However true the above arguments may be, recovery under the
insurance policy may be denied to the child because of the possibility
of fraud and collusion.28 The courts may reason, by analogy, that
since section 167(3) of the New York Insurance Law exempts insurers from responsibility in litigation between spouses because of
the danger of fraud, 29 similar coverage between parent and child
should be denied for the same reasons.
o
At common law a reciprocal disability existed between husband
and wife which precluded one from bringing an action sounding in
tort against the other. 30 This disability was swept awa, by the legislature in 1937,31 so that at the present time all inter-spouse actions
are allowed. 32 However, in the same act, the legislators revised the
Insurance Law of 1909 33 to relieve the insurer of liability in such
suits unless express provisions relating specifically thereto were included in the policy.34 The legislative intent ascribed by the courts
to the Insurance Law is to protect insurers against collusive suits. 35
However, recent interpretations of that law seem to indicate
that the courts are no longer in favor of the statute.30 In Catania v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. 3 7 suit was brought by a wife against
the employer of her husband for injuries sustained due to her husband's negligent operation of a car while on the defendant's business.
The court held the husband's insurer responsible for payment of any
judgment rendered against the employer. Had the wife sued her
husband she would not have obtained the coverage of the policy because of the exclusion provision in section 167(3). However, since
she sued the employer of her husband, she recovered on the theory
that the employer was entitled to coverage as an "additional insured"
28 See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1948); McCurdy,
supra note 25, at 1076.
29 "No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability

of an insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse or because
of injury to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse unless express
provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy." N.Y. INs.
LAW § 167(3).
30 Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).
31N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 669.
32 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 57, which reads in part: "A married woman
has a right of action against her husband for his wrongful or tortious acts
resulting to her in any personal injury . . . as if they were unmarried, and
she is liable to her husband for her wrongful or tortious acts resulting in
any such personal injury to her husband . . . as if they were unmarried."
3 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 13.
34 N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(3).
35Fuehs v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 258 App. Div. 603, 605, 17
N.Y.S.2d 338, 340 (2d Dep't 1940) ; Jacobs v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
2 Misc. 2d 428, 431, 152 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
36Lynch, Insurance, 33 N.Y.U.L. RZv. 1159, 1160 (1958).
37 4 App. Div. 2d 440, 166 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1st Dep't 1957) (per curiam).
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under the terms of the policy issued to the husband-employee. It
would seem that the possibility of collusion is not materially reduced
merely by virtue of the fact that there is an additional insured under
the policy. Nevertheless, this decision limited the application of
section 167(3) to direct actions between spouses.
In American Sur. Co. v. Diamond38 the action was brought
against the insured on the theory of imputed negligence. The question arose as to the nature and extent of the co-operation clause of
th'e policy and the court held that the clause binding the defendant
to assist in the conduct of suits did not obligate him to verify a crosscomplaint, thus the insurance company had to defend and pay any
judgment despite the possibility of collusion.
The subrogation privileges of the insurer were limited in Ulanoff
v. Croyden Shirt Co.39 The wife instituted suit against the corporation whose car her husband was driving at the time of the accident.
The insurer of the corporation demanded subrogation privileges
against the husband-employee. The court held that the corporation
did not violate the co-operation and subrogation clauses of the policy
by refusing to verify or sign the complaint of impleader. Again the
wife recovered indirectly that which she could not directly. It has
been said "that the philosophy of the courts in the Ulanoff, Cataniaand
American Surety decisions indicates that, since we have compulsory
insurance in this state, they are no longer in sympathy .. .

."

with

section 167(3) .4 0 The same commentator has indicated that this
present judicial trend may prompt the legislature to amend the section,
making it mandatory to cover inter-spouse liability.41 In fact such
42
an amendment was proposed in the last session of the legislature.
It would seem then, in light of the recent interpretations of section 167(3) and its proposed amendment, that the fear of fraud and
collusion in this area has subsided.
Thus if the courts or the legislature reject the validity of the
common-law reasons for the immunity between parent and child, but
nevertheless deny insurance coverage on the analogy of section
167(3), they would not be consonant with the present trend to negate
the effects of the statute.
Furthermore, the concept of fraud as a basis for denying suits
between parent and minor child appears questionable in view of the
38 1 N.Y.2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876, 154 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1956).
390 14 Misc. 2d 13, 174 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
4 Lynch, Insurance, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1159, 1160 (1958).
4'Ibid.; see Note, 32 ST. JoHN's L. RFv. 273 (1958).
42

A. Int. No. 316; S. Int. No. 277 (1959).

The proposed amendment pro-

vides that every such policy or contract would be deemed to insure against
any liability of an insured because of the death of, or injuries to, his or her
spouse or because of injury to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse,
and that no such policy may be issued ifl this state unless it includes express
provisions relating specifically thereto.
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inconsistencies created by the courts themselves when dealing with
such cases.
44
43
Other courts have held, and New York courts have implied,
that the immunity doctrine is limited to unintentional torts. In
Cannon v. Cannon 45 the child was suing for ordinary negligence.
The court said it was ".

.

. not prepared, in cases where wilful mis-

conduct by the parent is not a factor . . ." 46 to impose parental
liability. Noteworthy in this regard is that three judges in Sorrentino
v. Sorrentino47 dissented and voted to sustain the complaint in an
action by a minor child against the parent to recover for ordinary
negligence.
Also, in Siembab v. Siembab 48 the court indicated that it would
have sustained a complaint based on willful misconduct had the plaintiff included sufficient factual averments to support the general allegations of willfullness. The immunity doctrine was finally abolished
in New York in the area of willful torts in Henderson v. Henderson,49
where the plaintiff alleged that the father drove at an excessive rate
of speed while intoxicated. In so holding, the court did not question
the possibility of fraud. Yet it would seem that the danger of fraud
is no greater in cases involving ordinary negligence. Therefore, if
the courts uphold the immunity doctrine in cases of ordinary negligence because of the danger of fraud, but deny its application in cases
of willful torts without mention of fraud, there will be a basic
dichotomy in the law difficult of rational explanation.
In like manner, there have been other qualifications to the general doctrine. In each instance the possibility of fraud was no less
than in the usual case and yet in each of the instances recovery was
allowed.
In Dunlap v. Dunlap -0 a minor was permitted to sue for injuries sustained in the course of employment by his father. Although
one of the factors leading the court to allow the maintenance of the
43 See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. App. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218, 223-24
(1955); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). The court in the
latter case stated: "[W]hen . . . the parent is guilty of acts which show
complete abandonment of the parental relation, the rule giving him immunity
from suit by the child, on the ground that discipline should be maintained in
the home, cannot logically be applied, for when he is .guilty of such acts he
forfeits his parental authority and privileges, including his immunity from
suit." 77 A.2d at 926.
44 See Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942).
45 Ibid.
46 Id. at 429, 40 N.E.2d at 238.
47248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928) (memorandum decision). The three
dissenting judges were Cardozo, Crane and Andrews.
48284 App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (4th Dep't 1954).
49 11 Misc. 2d 449, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
5084 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
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action was the presence of liability insurance, it dismissed as unsound the danger of fraud and collusion. 51
Similarly, when an action was brought against the father in his
52
vocational capacity as a common carrier, recovery was allowed.
Here again, the court relied somewhat on the presence of insurance
but nevertheless dismissed the contention of fraud.
In Davis v. Smith 53 the court said that although there may be
parental immunity during life, it does not extend to the personal
representative of the deceased parent; thus an action was
54 allowed
against the estate without mention of the danger of fraud.
It is obvious that there is also a possibility of collusion where
an emancipated child sues his parent. Nevertheless, in such cases
the immunity doctrine is not applied and the emancipated child is
permitted to recover.5 5 And in Minkin v. Minkin, where the minor
plaintiff fell within the class of persons entitled to entertain actions
under the wrongful death statutes, the court held that this was a
declaration of public policy by the legislature which necessarily displaced any policy to the contrary. 56
In each of the above cases, the courts dismissed as unsound or
failed to discuss the possibility and danger of fraud. But the danger
of fraud is no greater when the parent is sued for negligence in his
parental capacity than when he is sued in another capacity. The
danger cannot logically be a basis for denying an action in one case,
and not in the other.
Danger-Real or Apparent?
Since the fear of fraud tends to bring confusion into the law
it is worthy of examination in order to determine whether the fear
is more apparent than real.
51

150 Atl. at 909.

52 Worrell

v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (action against
father for negligence of his employee); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E.
538 (1932) (defendant father was operator and owner of school bus in which
plaintiff rode to school).
53 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958).
4 Ibid. Contra, Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940),
which held that death of the parent does not affect the application of the immunity rule. . Cf. Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 201 Misc. 453, 106 N.Y.S.2d 481
(Sup. Ct. 1951). This was an action by the administrator of the mother's
estate against her son for negligence. The court held that the immunity doctrine applies even though the suit is by the estate rather than the mother.
5 See, e.g., Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908);
Lancaster v. Lancaster, 213 Miss. 536, 57 So. 2d 302 (1952); accord, Crosby
v. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N.Y. Supp. 384 (3d Dep't 1930), wherein
the mother alleged the emancipation of the child and the court held that this
was a question for determination by the jury.
51 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939); accord, Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass.
297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940). Contra, Durham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 76, 85 So. 2d
807 (1956), where it was held that the statute did not abrogate the common-law
rule.
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It can truthfully be said that there is a danger of fraud in every
area of the law. 57 But to conclude from this that an entire body of
cases should be removed from judicial determination and thereby
leave aggrieved persons without a remedy is an altogether different
matter. The efficacy of the judicial system in deciding between truth
and falsity should not be rendered inoperative because of an
"impotence which is not usually assumed." 5s
Furthermore, since the purpose of the compulsory insurance law
is that drivers be financially responsible, can it be said that a parent's
duty to protect the rest of the community is higher than his obligation to his own child? 59
The inability of the courts to deal with fraud is not so great
that these unfavorable effects must be tolerated. As stated by one
court, "where such relationship exists, however, the conduct and testimony of the parties should be carefully scrutinized .

. . ."

6

With

the proper safeguards the courts can effectively guard against the occurrence of fraud. In order to provide these safeguards it must be
realized that the insurance companies are the actual defendants and
that they must be able "to protect themselves in the light of the true
situation, without being hampered by technical procedural rules." 61
Thus, in Massachusetts, which also has compulsory liability insurance, the insurance company is permitted to impeach its own witness
(the insured) .62 In another jurisdiction the court admitted evidence
of the fact of insurance coverage and the relationship between the
nominal parties in order to assist
the jury in appraising the testimony
63
of the motorist and his wife.
Finally, the answer to the ultimate problem of whether recovery
should be allowed in such actions involves the reconciliation of those
social interests fundamental to the law of torts with the possible occurrence of fraud in the actions. It would seem, with the precautions
mentioned above and others the courts devise, that the interests
served by permitting suits between parent and child exceed to a great
degree the danger of fraud presented by such suits.

57 This is evidenced by the fact that in contract cases the courts have been
reluctant to define fraud in exact terms. They reason that if a boundary line
between what is fraud and what is not fraud is defined, unscrupulous persons
may manage their conduct so as to be "within the law." WHITNEY, CONTRACTS
§ 57, at 149 (6th ed. 1958).
5 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 911 (1930).
59 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343, 349 (1939).
60 State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1939).
61 James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAw
& CorTcmP. PROB. 431, 433 n.l1 (1950).
62 Horneman v. Brown, 286 Mass. 65, 190 N.E. 735 (1934).
63 Christie v. Eager, 129 Conn. 62, 26 A.2d 352 (1942).
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Parent v. Child

It is interesting to note that in the relatively few reported cases
involving actions by parents against their children for personal torts,
the courts have almost uniformly held that no such action could be
maintained.6 4 In support of this conclusion, the courts have relied
primarily upon the policy of protecting family harmony r5 and the
analogous rule barring 'actions for personal tort by a child against
his parent.6 6 The courts have pointed out that the parent is the
natural guardian of the child and should not be allowed to assume
the inconsistent position of attempting to recover damages from him. 7
In Boehm v. C. M. Gridley & Sons6 8 the court quoted at great
length from Cannon v. Cannon,69 a case wherein a child was suing
the parent. The former concluded its decision by stating
that the reasons and principles set forth above, which prompted the Court of
Appeals to deny to an unemancipated child a right of action against the parents
. . . apply with equal vigor and force to an70 action of similar nature by a
parent against his or her unemancipated child.

This decision was premised on the similarity in nature between the
two types of action. However, the court did not establish any relationship between them nor did it endeavbf to explain why the same
reasoning is applicable in both instances. The only possible similarity is that in both cases there may be a disturbance of domestic
tranquility. But if the action by the parent against the child is viewed
as a manifestation of the parent's right to discipline and punish his
child, then such an action would be a proper disturbance of, family
harmony.
Accepting the conclusion of the court in the Boehm case that
the reasoning in both situations should be the same, the problem may
well be considered academic. Since, because of compulsory insurance
the immunity doctrine would seem logically to be no longer applicable
in suits by children against parents, it a fortiori ought not be applicable to suits by parents against children.

64 See, e.g., Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942) ; Schneider
v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 AtI. 498 (1930); Rines v. Rines, 97 N.H. 55,
80 A.2d 497 (1951). Contra, Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932).
65 Duffy v. Duffy, 117 Pa. Super. 500, 178 At. 165 (1935).
b6 Boehm v. C. M. Gridley & Sons, 187 Misc. 113, 63 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup.

Ct. 1946).

Shaker v. Shaker, supra note 64; Schneider v. Schneider, supra note 64.
68 187 Misc. 113, 63 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
69287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942).
70 Boehm v. C. M. Gridley & Sons, supra note 66, at 119, 63 N.Y.S.2d at
592-93.
67
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Conclusion
Before the widespread use of liability insurance, the holdings of
the courts in denying intra-family negligence actions were generally
correct. The reasoning of the doctrine might not have been clearly
articulated nor logically presented, but the general revulsion of the
community to such suits was reason enough for their disallowance.
It must be remembered, however, that the immunity doctrine was
established at a time when accident litigation was looked upon as a
private contest between individuals with which society was not concerned; 71 liability was considered as shifting the loss from the person
who suffered it to the person who caused it. 72 There is today, howa
ever, an altogether different approach to tort law. Society has
73
definite and vital interest in accidents and their resulting losses.
Furthermore, since section 167(3), which excepts a spouse from
the other spouse's insurance coverage unless the policy specifies such
coverage, is subject to a recent trend to limit its application, it is
poor authority for disallowing personal tort actions between parent
and child.
Upon analysis of the reasons urged for its support, it is clear
that present application of the rule prohibiting suits between parent
and child would be contrary to logic and good reason. The doctrine
should therefore be abolished.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH A GRAND JURY

Objections to the -validity of indictments in recent cases have
spotlighted the problem of grand jury secrecy, especially as it
pertains to unauthorized communications.' The purpose of this note
is to examine this area of the law.
Secrecy has cloaked grand jury proceedings for centuries. 2 The
71 See McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST.
JOHN's L. Rav. 255, 258 (1952); BoWMaAN, ELEMENTARY LAW 80 (1929).

72 See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
73 Id. at 549-50.
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